Towards a Democratization of Knowledge with Topological Emphasis in Economics by ROSAS-MARTINEZ, Víctor H.
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 3                            December 2016                            Issue 4 
 
Towards a Democratization of Knowledge with 
Topological Emphasis in Economics 
 
By Víctor H. ROSAS-MARTINEZ
a†
 
 
Abstract. We formulate and prove a theorem which consists in how the natural endogenous 
antagonist interaction of agents who look for understanding a generalizable phenomenon, 
results in a tendency towards chaos. This takes us to the final absolution of implementing 
the majority rule as the only instrument that generates socially acceptable knowledge, 
escaping from the chaos tendency. Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the arise of 
multiple simultaneous antagonist postures on the explanation of a phenomenon, and 
through an application of the Pythagoras theorem, we prove that it takes less effort or 
sacrifice for an agent to learn strategically to get an explanation, than if she was the creator 
of the concerning knowledge, which implies different consequences of possible topological 
private and public tendencies. 
Keywords. Antagonist endogenous knowledge, Social entropy, Chaos theorem, Social 
choice. 
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“Pure mathematics is, in its way, the poetry of logical ideas” 
Albert Einstein 
 
1. Introduction 
his work is meant to capture a broad representation of the process which 
takes place on the formation of knowledge. It is based on qualitative 
observations more than on quantitative ones. Although this generalization 
can be understood as explanatory for different sciences, we shall introduce it with 
examples of economics that result highly illustrative, not only because we are more 
familiarized with them, but also because we consider that are more popular among 
readers. 
The formation of knowledge is always preceded by complicated eternal and 
antagonist debates which are leaded by thinkers that truly believe they are right, as 
if their position was a sort of religion. For example, we can look at the well known 
Keynesians vs Neoclassical debate. Another more recent but not less essential in 
the understanding of economics which starts from questioning the very foundations 
of microeconomics, is the Sraffian capital debate vs the Neoclassical praxis, where 
according to each group of prominent thinkers, the truth lies in their position
i
. 
Most of these debates are developed upon wether some assumptions or 
properties should be treated as truth or not
ii
, and the deeper the reader gets, the 
more likely will be for her to join a partial position. 
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Among other debates we can highlight the different opinions on the future of 
the economic growth of the countries, where authors like Kaldor argued that the 
regions show convergence in real per capita GDP levels, while forexample 
Accinelli et al. (2010) and Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) explainhow the nations 
diverge depending on initial levels. 
Independently of time, although there are specific theoretical positions based on 
the statisticinference that look for answering which of the previously mentioned 
views isright, such as the approach to assess robustness proposed by Sala-i-Martin 
(1997), deep thinkers do not seem to be satisfied, and keep arising with newpoints 
of view or proposed variables concerning the debated topics,diverging 
continuously. 
Considering the antagonistic nature of these phenomena, we shall develop 
arepresentation and a theorem which allows the reader to understand thedivergent 
dynamic of positions over facts, also enhancing the visualizationof a chaotic future 
in the absence of a stopping mechanism and thus aknowledge democracy. 
Posteriorly we prove a sacrifice theorem which takinginto account the existence of 
knowledge prerequisites, stablishes that it iseasier to follow than innovating, and 
we do this through an application ofthe Pythagoras theorem. Furthermore, this 
work can also be found as anexposition of foundations behind why it is important 
not only for economiststo study Social Choice. 
 
2. The model 
All the agents are located in a convex closed set of ℝ+
𝑛  which contains the 
vector zero. The model is based on theintuitive assumption that one of the 
dimensions captures the level ofantagonism and capability, such that if the agents 
are located in a closureit means that are the creators of the deepest explanation 
which justifies anantagonist position. This means that the agents in this dimension's 
closuresgo deeper in the debated points (considering more aspects), which thus 
pushesthem to such position, and that they propose the more complex and ruling 
explanations, where the closures of such dimension thus represent a current 
boundary of human understanding
iii
. Furthermore this means that the intermediate 
point inthis dimension is occupied by the agents who are indifferent in terms of 
thediscussed topic. 
The rest of the dimensions capture a location of the agents in terms ofother 
aspects, like space or a sport taste. Each agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 has apersonal scope to share 
theoretical findings representing her flexibility tointeract with the individuals who 
are different. We accept that the scope intolerating other positions is equal for all 
the agents, and that it isequally annoying and possible for them to do a personal 
sacrifice in anydirection despite their personal characteristics and the income 
distribution. Therefore we can represent the individual's scope with a constant 
distance 𝑘, such that the 𝑘 radio ball surrounding an agentdenotes her effective 
interaction area
iv
. 
The first entry of the vector of coordinates of the location of an agent 𝑖 at the 
time 𝑡  is given by 𝑙𝑖 ∈  𝐴𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , where 𝐴𝑡  and 𝐷𝑡  represent the borders of 
humanknowledge. 
Although looking for understanding the intertemporal metric behavior of 
thenew knowledge happenings could takes us to fruitful findings, in this workwe 
rather consider the following properties or attributes, which are inherent or present 
inthe process that we are dealing with. 
Constant presence of leadership: 𝑙𝑖 = 𝐴𝑡 ∧ 𝑙𝑗 = 𝐷𝑡  for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 , and thus 
 𝑁 ≥ 2. Moreover, the individuals in this closure are called knowledge authority. 
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This property considers how it is important to notice that the closuresexist for 
all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 because there is at least one authority in the already mentioned frontier 
of human knowledge. Further more, by common sense we know that all the 
inventions or new theories are built or not, constantly using previous ones as abase 
or influence
v
, and to represent this we define the following inter temporal property. 
Constant scientific progress: (i) Strict; 𝐴𝑡 < 𝐴𝑡−𝑥 ∧ 𝐷𝑡 > 𝐷𝑡−𝑥 . (ii) Weak; 
𝐴𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝑡−𝑥 −
1
 𝑑𝑢
𝑡
𝑡−𝑥
∧ 𝐷𝑡 ≥ 𝐷𝑡−𝑥 +
1
 𝑑𝑢
𝑡
𝑡−𝑥
. 
 
2.1. Local consensus 
As we have previously mentioned, the agents are able to come up with 
anexplanation about the discussed topic, however, the communication among 
agents can take them to understand and/or support deeper and thus ruling theories 
which are proposed by others. This means that if an agent 𝑖is located inside of the 
closed 𝑘 radio ball surrounding 𝑗, the deeperexplanation which is accessed by these 
two agents can be supported by bothas a kind of local consensus. 
As we have previously mentioned, a location 𝑙𝑖  does not only capture alevel of 
capability, but a posture as well, such that an individual in the middle of the 
interval  𝐴𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , is located there because is not capable of taking a posture on her 
own. Furthermore, the possible local consensus also imply that this “indifferent” 
individual could support a partial position under certain conditions, which we will 
later explain. 
A set of interaction is a coalition 𝑆 ∈ 2𝑁  which satisfies  𝑆 > 1, formed by the 
individuals who are located suchthat, for any agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 there is at least another 
individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 with the 𝑘 radio ball surrounding her having a non empty 
intersection withthe 𝑘  radio ball surrounding 𝑖. 
To represent how the agents have defined a posture on the theoretical debate, 
after interacting, the individuals will always support the deepest thesis which they 
can access and agree with. In other words, they will support the position of the 
agent who belongs to their set of interaction, and that is closer to the closure in the 
dimension of positions to whichthey are closer. Moreover, an “indifferent” agent 
will thus support the position of the individual within her interaction set, that is 
more distant from hers
vi
. 
As we can see, this means that determinedly among the agents forming a 
coalition 𝑆 ∈ 2𝑁  there are one or two consensuses to which we shall refer to as 
local consensus. 
2.2. Debate and social problems 
As it can be verified, these debates can originate problems which 
affectnegatively the life style of the population showing violent consequences like 
for example the witch hunting leaded by the spanish inquisition. 
This is, although it may be “normal” for many regions to presence such kind of 
“generalizable” happenings, the produced effects can reach devastating outcomes. 
Wanting to consider, how the local consensus are already in favor of one of 
thetheoretical positions, and that the capable individuals look for “approaching” 
and sharing the “true” explanation, imposing their visible localized views,we shall 
define a measure of social stabilitylikelihood based on howdivergent the positions 
are. 
The antagonism which derives naturally from the knowledge formation is as we 
have mentioned “normally” problematic, and both postures or thoughts have 
usually followers, which iswhy independently of the formed intermediate local 
consensus and the numberof followers, we shall base our measure on how difficult 
it becomes to reacha global consensus that avoids social problems. 
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In this way, for a given period 𝑡 we can just take the distance 𝑙𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡as a 
therefore absolute global indicator of social instability, due to the impossibility to 
reach agreements, such that a higher 𝑙𝑡  indicatesa thus more chaotic social 
situation. 
𝐻 is the set of coalitions of elements of ℝwithcardinality two. The function 
𝑓: 𝐻 ⟶ 𝐻  takes the pair of leading positions {𝐴𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑡−𝑥}  and gives back the 
knowledgefrontiers of the next period whose standardspace ℝ+
𝑛  fitting thus has had 
then ever contradicting properties of “Constant scientific progress” and “Constant 
presence of leadership”. 
This in turns means that 𝑓(𝑡) is a function that focuses only on the evolution 
ofthe frontiers of knowledge. 
Theorem (Chaos): lim𝑡⇢∞ 𝐼𝑡 ⟶ ∞. 
Proof: To avoid limiting our analysis i.e. get a more strict proof, we shall focus 
only on the weak “constant scientific progress” property being present such that 
𝑡 > 𝑥 ⟶ 𝐴𝑡 < 𝐴𝑥 ∧ 𝐷𝑡 > 𝐷𝑥 .From this we deduce that 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡 > 𝐷𝑥 − 𝐴𝑥 ⟷
𝑡 > 𝑥. Since we only have interest in the standard proof that considers the strict 
increase of the distances in the middle we get that 𝑡 − 𝑥 ⟶ ∞ ⟷  𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑥 −
 𝐴𝑡 − 𝐴𝑥 ⟶ ∞. Finally we can justconsider the particular case of 𝑥 = 0, and any 
posterior 𝑡  tending toinfinite illustrates the divergence growth (of 𝐼𝑡 ) and 
chaos.Q.E.D. 
As we can see this theorem means that with the pass of time, the understanding 
of the agents on an issue gets deeper, and that it also beyond limits becomes more 
difficult for them to reach a global consensus, or agreement, thus tending to more 
chaotic social dynamics at least due to the need foradopting a posture when general 
decisions are taken
vii
. Further more, for some reason, as a sort of established rivalry 
of novelties, due to a continuous application of the mean value theorem, we know 
that the indifferent agent(s) shall constantly occupy the mean point between the 
determined closures.  
2.3. Escaping from chaos 
Now that we have identified the open tendency towards chaos, what could be 
donein order to avoid such a cruel destiny for the human kind? 
Although dictatorship of knowledge seems to be the easiest alternative in terms 
of implementation by countries, because it does not require the approval of 
eachindividual, we recognize the right of the agents to participate in theformation 
of the information which shall be considered as true in thefunctioning of their 
world. Therefore, based on that the equality for all 𝑥, ∈ 𝑁 cannot be but with the 
majorityrule as the mechanism through which a final more desired consensus and 
thus,a socially acceptable knowledge could be adopted, it remainsto naturally 
highlight how theindividuals may increase their participation and promotion of 
localconsensus to impact their daily living.  
Raza et. al. (2007) demonstrate that the social democratization of knowledgefor 
e-learning (without confusing it with the free access concept) can leadto the 
establishment of viable global civil society, helping millions inAsia, Africa and 
South America to contribute and share the fruits ofknowledge explosion in a just, 
equitable and honorable fashion. On the otherhand, some works that study 
problems which can arise when the majority ruleis used are Condorcet (1785), 
Plata (1999), and the manipulation possibility of strategic voting studied by 
Salvador Barbera (Jackson & Sonnenschein, 2011).  
Assuming the democracy mechanism to start being implemented in the period 
𝑡′ does not mean that the evaluations of the function 𝑓𝑡 ′ start showing 
convergence
viii
, but instead itmeans that the index 𝐼𝑡′  becomes useless due to 
theintellectual exercise subordination to the will of the majority. Therefore, the 
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chosen postures on the matters would depend on the distribution ofindividuals over 
the different local consensus
ix
, which implies avoidingsocial problems at a possible 
cost of exercising a minor to the frontier local consensus
x
. 
2.4. Social stability and multiple antagonist postures 
As we have previously mentioned, because of the antagonist nature 
ofknowledge there are polar disagreements between thinkers, however, in 
theadvance of a phenomenon understanding we can find the formation of 
newdebates and antagonist positions within a single posture.Considering howthis 
could take place, we get that the local consensus could now be locatedin different 
points. 
The interpretation of this is given by the arise of an extra dimension 
whichindicates the position of the agents in terms of the new debate, where a 
newdirection can be taken at certain point of the previous postures. Moreover, 
notice that considering more than one debate allows thepossibility of theagents 
occupying more than one position at the same time, because a leaderin a position 
could also be a leader in another debate within that position. 
The formation of multiple debates is of our concern because of the 
socialinstability that derives from it. In order to understand the socialinstability it is 
fundamental to understand when there are knowledgerequirements to be able to get 
a posture in a new debate. To illustrate thiswe consider the following case: 
Case 1 (Strict requirements debate): 𝑙𝑖 𝑗 ≠ 𝑎𝑗 ⟷ 𝑙𝑖 𝑗 − 1 ≥ 𝑟𝑗∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 
where 𝑙𝑖 𝑗  is the location of 𝑖, 𝑎𝑗  is the indifference level and 𝑟𝑗  is the origin level 
in the debate 𝑗 − 1all with respect to the 𝑗𝑡ℎ debate. 
In this way if there were not requirements in a debate, the agents could 
belocated in any planed coordinate within the newly considered closed intervals. 
Moreover, given that to get a position in a debate, the requirements increase 
depending on how deep into the new posture an agent can be, the agents can only 
be located in terms of a new debate as itfollows. 
Theindividuals can only be located in terms of their posture on a phenomenon 𝑗, 
within the triangle that has 𝑟𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗−1 as base, and height 𝐷𝑡 𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗  or 𝑎𝑗 − 𝐴𝑡(𝑗), 
where 𝐷𝑡 𝑗  and 𝐴𝑡(𝑗) are the frontiers of human knowledge interms of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ 
debate. _ 
Moreover, this means that when the debate fromwhich the new one arose gets 
deeper, then the agents could also be locatedin the area of the rectangle
xi
 that has 
such new boundary ∓  the level 𝑟𝑗  asa base, and 𝐷𝑡 𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗  or 𝑎𝑗 − 𝐴𝑡(𝑗)  as 
height.__  
This also means that if more than one debate arises at a single level 
ofknowledge, then the individuals could be located in terms of position withinthe 
triangle in the 𝑂 dimensions, where there were 𝑂 − 1 arising debates. ___𝑡 
The interpretation of this visualization is that an agent located in thehypotenuse 
of the triangle or “below” does not really get the new debate, but instead it has 
some of the requiredknowledge to get it. 
Considering how each of these dimensions keeps being associated with 
thecapability and effort of the agents, we formulate the following theorem. 
Theorem (Sacrifice): It takes less effort, sacrifice or capability to learn or copy 
requirementsthan to innovate, propose, or discover to get to the knowledge of 
thefrontiers of an arisen debate. 
Proof: For 0 − 1  arising debates we can write this argument as ℎ < 𝑎 + 𝑏 , 
where ℎ is the distance between the previous indifference point and the 
newfrontiers' coordinates, 𝑎 is the base of the triangle in the 0 dimensions, and 𝑏 is 
its height.Since ℎ2 = 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 and  𝑎 + 𝑏 2 > 𝑎2 + 𝑏2. Q.E.D. 
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An example of this theorem is given by how it takes less effort to learnmath and 
economic intuition simultaneously, than to first understand math
xii
 and then 
economics to be able to get the explanation of aneconomic rule like monopoly 
pricing. In others word, this theoremmeans that given the rational agents, it is 
easier to get somewhere when thefinal destination is known, or that it is easier to 
get something whichrequires knowledge that is already possessed by the 
individual. 
Further study can be done concerning the rate of growth of 𝑟𝑗 ′𝑠 base on the 
interest-need and capacity of the interagents population 𝑁, where extending our 
analysis to the behavior of 𝑘′𝑠comparisons would present an evident degree of 
importance, relevant to the “constant presence of leadership” propertyxiii.  
In terms of stability this means that although the topologically defined debates 
within a debatecan bring problematic social dynamics, the added instability is even 
higherbecause there can be moredistinctlocal consensus
xiv
. Therefore, to consider 
this in a simple way we redefine theinstability indicator for 𝑂 related debates, as if 
there were not, knowledge requisites in the following  
 
𝐼𝑡 =    𝐷𝑡 𝑖 − 𝐴𝑡(𝑖) 
𝑖=1
 
 
Up to this point we may want to ask to ourselves: What went wrong? Or, what 
could go wrong? Given every distinct secure agent, it is obvious how for different 
of these very well topologically defined arising debates that are in thesame 
dimension
xv
, only the moreadvanced boundaries should be considered to 
understand and thus measure instability. Moreover, based on thesatisfaction of the 
“constant scientificprogress”property, we can verify and prove how theprevious 
unlimited chaos theorem is true for all the newly defined agreements𝐼𝑡 ′𝑠! 
 
3. Conclusions 
From the representation we get a clear explanation and intuition behind 
theformation of local consensus that look for explaining certain phenomenon. 
We introduced a measure of social instability which is based on howdifficult it 
becomes for the individuals to agree and form a globalconsensus. Moreover, our 
theorem contributed in showing how the evolution ofthe boundaries of knowledge 
leads a population to increasingly chaoticsocial dynamics, which took us to the 
unavoidable proposal of a mechanism,to reach social agreements on which 
knowledge shall be considered as true ormainstream, in this way facilitating the 
taking of general decisions. 
As we can see, our work contributed not only to address questions 
abouttendencies over time in terms of social problems and stability, but also 
toestablish a solution to the incoming chaos named the democratization of 
knowledge, which has the advantage of allowing the individuals toparticipate in the 
formation of scientific information. In this way, thewinning postures on the matters 
would depend on the distribution ofindividuals among the different local 
consensus, which implies avoidingsocial problems at a possible cost of exercising 
an inferior to the frontierlocal consensus. Furthermore, we could remark how it 
may already beobservable “normal” in many regions to observe theemployment of 
this kind of mechanisms, which so far can be interpreted as ajustification not only 
for economists to get deeper inthe study of Social Choice. 
Finally, the sacrifice theorem allows us to get the importance of knowledge 
requirements for the understanding of a scientific posture, and to remarkthe efforts 
of the individuals who although chaotically, build informationat the frontiers of 
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human knowledge, implying different consequences of possible private and public 
mechanisms tendencies for unexpected welfare levels, and thus highlighting the 
growing importanceof composed human capital. 
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Notes 
 
i e.g. Petri (2009; 2013), Garegnani (2003; 2005), Mandler (2002; 2005), Lazzarini (2011). 
ii For example, the treatment of the capital as an homogeneous good of the models of economic 
growth, discussed in the mentioned Sraffian capital debate, which leads to wondering about the 
correct properties of an aggregate production. 
iii A unidimensional representation of the location of agents can be found in Hotelling (1929). 
iv  We could reject the assumption about the interdimensional equally annoying and possible 
sacrifices, and represent the maximum sacrifice of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ dimension by 𝑘𝑗 , which means that the 
effective interaction area of an individual would be given by an 𝑛 dimensional ellipse. Moreover, 
depending on different hypothesis of behavior, we could represent an effective interaction area with 
a not necessarily convex closed set, surrounding an agent without altering our qualitative results. 
v This means that the leaders are always able to pass to more capable individuals, the interest for 
continuing the search for deeper and better explanations. 
vi The deepest explanation that she has received, where being part of a local consensus does not 
necesarily mean that the explanation has been truly understood. 
vii  It can be verified that in the equality case of the “constant scientific progress” property 
∆𝐷𝑡
∆𝐷𝑡+1
,
∆𝐷𝑡
∆𝐷𝑡+1
=
𝑡+∆𝑡
𝑡
> 1. 
viii Which could be true if the mechanism included the dictation or prohibition to stop the study of the 
bound of the loosing position. 
ix  Santerre (2008) focuses on how the scientific and technical culture has become an interface, 
stimulating exchanges between scientists and other social actors, resulting in research being more 
attuned to community needs. 
x  This is because as we have previously mentioned, the agents who are part of different local 
consensus are not necessarily able to effectively interact with some one who explains them at least 
convincingly enough a deeper consensus, or the frontier of their position. 
xi Or square. 
xii Or Phisics. 
xiii The corresponding extension should consider or obey the catastrophic dynamic regimechange 
mathematic schema studied in Brida et al. (2011).  
xiv  The set of possible local positions including consensus is 2𝑁\∅ , and for enough existent 
knowledge, the possible knowledge tendencies are at least as many as possible set of disjoint non 
empty coalitions. 
xv i.e. that “normally” require the same kind of knowledge requisites. 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(4), V.H.R. Martinez, p.602-609. 
609 
 
References 
Accinelli, E., London, S., Punzo, L.F., & Carrera, E.S., (2010). Dynamic complementarities, 
efficiency and Nash Equilibria for populations of firms and workers. Journal of Economics and 
Econometrics, 53(1), 90-110. 
Brida, J.G., Mayer, A.L., McCord, C., & Punzo, L.F. (2011). A theoretical, multidisciplinary view of 
catastrophic regime change, in M.M. Peixoto, A.A. Pinto & D.A. Rand (Eds.), Dynamics, Games 
and Science, (pp.223-236), New York: Springer Verlag. doi. 10.1007/978-3-642-14788-3_16 
Condorcet, M. (1785). Essay sur Vapplication de l'analyse a la probabilité des decisions rendues a le 
pluralité des voix, París. 
Garegnani, P. (2003). Savings, investment and capital in a system of general intertemporal 
equilibrium, in Petri and Hahn, pp.117-72.  
Garegnani, P. (2005). Capital and intertemporal equilibrium: A reply to Mandler, Metroeconomica, 
56(4), 411-437. doi. 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00223.x 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57. doi. 
10.2307/2224214 
Howitt, P., & Mayer-Foulkes, D. (2005). R&D, implementation and sagnation: A Schumpeterian 
theory of convergence clubs, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(1), 147-77. 
Jackson, M.O., & Sonnenschein, H.F. (2011). Introduction to the special issues in honor of Salvador 
Barberà's 65th birthday, Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2(4), 423-430. doi. 
10.1007/s13209-011-0081-4 
Lazzarini, A. (2011). Revisiting the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies: A Historical and 
Analytical Study, Pavia: Pavia University Press. 
Mandler, M. (2002). Classical and neoclassical indeterminacy in one-shot versus ongoing equilibria, 
Metroeconomica, 53(3), 203-222. doi. 10.1111/1467-999X.00141 
Mandler, M. (2005). Well-behaved production economies, Metroeconomica, 56(4), 477-494. doi. 
10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00225.x 
Petri, F. (2009). On The Recent Debate on Capital Theory and General Equilibrium”, Quaderni del 
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena, No.568. [Retrieved from]. 
Petri, F. (2013). Blaugh versus Garegnani on the `formalist revolution' and the evolution of 
neoclassical capital theory, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 36(4), 455-478. doi. 
10.1017/S105383721400056X 
Plata-Pérez, L. (1999). Amartya Sen y la economía del bienestar. Estudios Económicos, 14(1), 3-32. 
Raza, A., Kausar, A.R., & Paul, D. (2007). The social democratization of knowledge: some critical 
reflections on e-learning, Multicultural Education& Technology Journal, 1(1), 64-74. doi. 
10.1108/17504970710745210 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). I just ran two million regressions. The American Economic Review, 87(2), 
178-183.  
Santerre, L. (2008). From democratization of knowledge to Bridge building between science, 
technology and society, in D. Cheng, M. Claessens, T. Gascoigne, J. Metcalfe, B. Schiele, S. Shi,  
Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices pp.289-300, Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands. doi. 10.1007/978-1-4020-8598-7_17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
